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“I’m Litigatin’ It”: Infringement, Dilution, and
Parody Under the Lanham Act
By Patrick Emerson *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Outside of the trademark registration process, the federal Lanham Act provides two
causes of action, infringement and dilution, to holders of protectable trademarks to
exclude others from using their marks. 1 Both of these actions can be defeated by the
defense of parody, which is a subset of the defense of “fair use.” For actions against
dilution of protectable marks, Congress formally codified the parody defense for the first
time in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (“TDRA,” 2006) amendments to the
Lanham Act. 2
This Comment argues that codification has done little to strengthen protection of
trademark parody in the courts. Parody should be a strong bar to recovery, particularly in
dilution actions in which the plaintiff is not required to prove confusion. I argue that the
existing body of law in this area suggests courts tend to be moralistic and unpredictable
in their interpretation of the parody defense. Finally, I suggest that the protection of
parodies should be decided based on the question of whether a parody meets a stringent
definition, not on whether the parody is more or less “commercial.” Focusing on the
commercial dimension has negative consequences for freedom of consumption.
Focusing instead on the definition of the parody protects consumer freedom, while
effectively preventing free riding.
This Comment has a broad reach and seeks primarily to make a policy argument. I
proceed by critically analyzing case law and the reasoning behind groups of decisions. I
do not argue that any individual case should have been decided differently, but rather that
courts’ approach to the parody defense should be reconsidered, as if necessary should the
law. In Section II, I address the basic policy rationales behind infringement and dilution.
In Section III, I address the portions of the Lanham Act defining infringement and
dilution. In Section IV, I address the parody defense as it has been applied in the context
of the Lanham Act and in similar state statutes. 3 In Section V, I discuss the public policy
arguments for refocusing judicial inquiry regarding the parody defense more towards the
definition of a parody and away from the degree of commercialization, particularly when
a defendant raises the parody defense against a dilution action.

*

Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, 2011.
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141n (2009). (Subsequent statutory citations are all to this Act, and
are divided by the Act’s internal section numbers.)
2
§ 43(c)(3)(A)(ii).
3
Although this Comment focuses on the Lanham Act, I also discuss case law applying dilution and
infringement actions at state law, where the cases serve to illustrate trends in the law and judicial behavior.
1
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II. PUBLIC POLICY RATIONALES, INFRINGEMENT, AND DILUTION
¶4

¶5

¶6

¶7

A central distinction between dilution and infringement actions, both in federal
trademark law and also in state equivalents, concerns the public policy underlying the
actions. Dilution and infringement have been designed to protect two different groups.
Primarily, the infringement action serves to protect consumers. 4 Infringement is an
action brought by a holder of a trademark; success in court provides immediate and
obvious advantages for a producer of goods. However, consumers as a group are the
stakeholders of greatest public policy concern.
For example, when I buy a “Big Mac” I (a consumer) expect to receive a product
made by McDonald’s (a producer), with all of the associated ingredients and standards of
quality in production. The public utility of the infringement cause of action inheres
principally in the fact that I will not be bewildered into purchasing some interloping fast
food item also called a “Big Mac,” or “Big Ma C”. Likewise, public utility derives from,
for example, the protection of trade dress from infringement. Consumers are protected in
the trade dress context from the confusion of entering a restaurant that looks exactly like
a McDonald’s, but which is in fact a vegan diner. In short, producers are permitted by
law to seek a remedy for infringement at least in part because of the goodwill, or even
mere consumer recognition, attached to their product.
By contrast, the dilution action works principally for producers’ advantage. 5 The
dilution action does not directly pay dividends to consumers. Rather, the dilution action
protects trademarks from other producers. It does so even where there is no appreciable
risk that a consumer would mistake the origin of the product associated with the
trademark. 6 In fact dilution, which as with infringement is historically established in
state law as well as federal, protects producers even where the defendant is not in direct
competition with a plaintiff producer. For example, through this action, one court found
that the Georgia anti-dilution statute prohibited the production of sexualized images
featuring Milky Way’s trademarks “Poppin’ Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh.” 7 This was not
because of concern that consumers could be confused into thinking that the images were
a product of Milky Way or because of Milky Way’s opportunity cost in not producing the
images itself. Rather, the court ruled that indirect association with the images “tarnished”
Milky Way’s marks.
Tarnishment is one of two subsets of dilution now codified under the TDRA, along
with “blurring.” The full scope of the dilution action is discussed below. The salient
point for the purposes of public policy, however, is that marks such as Milky Way’s are
protected as if the exclusivity of the marks’ financial worth to one producer has inherent
value—as if public policy demanded that no one else should benefit financially from the
mark, even in a manner that the producer itself would never have considered. From a
public policy point of view, protection did not attach to Milky Way’s marks, as with
infringement, because of the public utility of avoiding consumer confusion. It attached
out of private convenience to Milky Way. Granted, Milky Way might not have filed suit
4

Corina I. Cacovean, Is Free Riding Aided by Parody to Sneak Between the Cracks of the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 441, 444 (2009).
5
Id.
6
§ 43(c)(1).
7
Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., No. C78-679A, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17722 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24,
1981).
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under a dilution theory (or won), against a more quotidian use of its trademark—for
example, “Milky Way Airlines.” However, this is only to say that there may be a corpus
of uses of “Milky Way” that is immune to dilution suits because it is less offensive and
thus less tarnishing. Whether under a tarnishment or a blurring theory of dilution,
unconfused consumers are still deprived of the universe of uses that is not immune from
dilution. As far as cartoon pornography is concerned, that is perhaps not much of a loss
to consumers. However, as I will discuss, the reach of dilution is broader than the
extreme example of Milky Way illustrates.
III. THE LANHAM ACT
A. Infringement
¶8

The Lanham Act prohibits anyone, without prior consent from the trademark
registrant, from using in commerce any “reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, distribution, or advertising of
any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion . . . mistake, or to deceive.” 8 It further prohibits reproduction, counterfeiting,
copying, or imitating marks for reproduction in labels, signs, prints, packages, and so on,
provided they are intended to be used in commerce in connection with sales, distribution,
or advertising, and provided there is a likelihood of confusion. 9
¶9
In order to prove infringement against a third party under the Lanham Act a
plaintiff needs to show that: (i) it owns a valid and protectable mark; (ii) the defendant
has used a reproduction, counterfeit, copy or imitation of the mark in some kind of
commerce without the plaintiff’s consent; and (iii) the defendant’s action is likely to
cause confusion.
¶10
In keeping with the value ascribed to protecting potentially confused consumers,
the courts have afforded wide latitude to what could constitute confusion. Confusion,
broadly speaking, includes cases where consumers may not be confused as to the origin
of the goods, but may be confused as to whether the non-mark-holding producer is in
some way connected to the primary mark-holder. 10
¶11
The breadth of interpretation afforded to confusion has implications for the parody
defense. For example, in Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, the Eighth
Circuit ruled that a magazine’s parody advertisement for Michelob beer, declaring
“Michelob Oily,” could confuse consumers. 11 Specifically, consumers could think that
the satire was in some way “connected” or affiliated to the producer of the beer (even
while not being confused into thinking that Michelob itself produced the parody). 12 The
court endorsed a broad interpretation of confusion:
Many courts have applied, we believe correctly, an expansive interpretation of
likelihood of confusion, extending “protection against use of [plaintiff's] mark on
any product or service which would reasonably be thought by the buying public
8

§ 32(1)(a).
§ 32(1)(b).
10
See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994).
11
Id.
12
Id. at 769.
9
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to come from the same source, or thought to be affiliated with, connected with, or
sponsored by, the trademark owner.” 13

B. Dilution
¶12

Notwithstanding the broad interpretation of confusion that courts have been willing
to apply, as illustrated by Anheuser-Busch, the fact that confusion is required to sustain
an infringement action at all is a distinction between infringement and dilution actions.
This distinction is key in the context of the parody defense. As confusion is not required
in dilution actions, trademark holders can sustain actions against parody: (i) even where
consumers get the joke, and (ii) where consumers are neither confused as to the origin of
the parody, nor confused into thinking that the parody producer is affiliated with the mark
holder. As such, dilution implicitly prioritizes the value of the mark over the value of the
joke, social commentary, satire, and so on that is contained in the parody. Moreover, it
prioritizes the “good name” of the mark over the comprehension of consumers that what
they are viewing is not in fact a product of the mark holder, but is instead a joke.
¶13
Although dilution is a recently codified addition to the Lanham Act, it is not a
particularly recent doctrine. Dilution has roots in European law, dating back to at least
the nineteenth century. 14 In 1927, Frank Schechter made the notion prominent on this
side of the Atlantic when he wrote the seminal The Rational Basis of Trademark
Protection for Harvard Law Review. 15 Schechter’s central thesis was that trademarks, by
1927, no longer represented merely the source of origin for goods, with their value being
drawn from the consumer’s identification of the producer. Rather, he argued that
trademarks had become independent drivers of custom, detached from consumer
recognition of the producer. 16 Schechter argued that consumers had come to identify
goods by the trademarks themselves, without regard for or knowledge of, the producer.
His idea foreshadows modern mass production and byzantine corporate structures, which
are clearly beyond the understanding of most consumers. 17 Thus, Schechter’s article
introduced the idea that trademarks have inherent value—that they are beacons for
consumers in a foggy consumerist world.
¶14
Further, Schechter concluded that “[t]rademark pirates are growing more subtle and
refined. They proceed circumspectly, by suggestion and approximation, rather than by
direct and exact duplication of their victims’ wares and marks.” 18 So the “pirates”
threatened the inherent value of marks; the time had come to take some buccaneers to the
gallows (or at least to federal court).
¶15
Reviewing possible solutions to the guile of the modern trademark pirate,
Schechter advocated something akin to the dilution doctrine, although without using the
exact term. Schechter discussed contemporary European cases involving well-known
brands, such as Rolls-Royce, Kodak, and Vogue, where non-competing producers

13

Id. at 774.
See DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL, STATE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 336
(2002).
15
Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927).
16
Id. at 814–19.
17
Id. at 814–16.
18
Id. at 825.
14
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appropriated their trademarks (for example producing Kodak bathtubs). 19 Outlining a
rationale for finding in favor of the primary user in these cases, Schechter defined what
we now call dilution as “the whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods.” 20 Schechter
supported providing greater protection for such brands, provided that the trademarks were
arbitrary or fanciful. He argued:
[T]here is not a single one of these fanciful marks which will not, if used on
different classes of goods, or to advertise different services, gradually but surely
lose its effectiveness and unique distinctiveness . . . . If “Kodak” may be used for
bath tubs and cakes, “Mazda” for cameras and shoes, or “Ritz-Carlton” for
coffee, these marks must inevitably be lost in the commonplace words of the
language, despite the originality and ingenuity in their contrivance, and the vast
expenditures in advertising them. 21

Schechter’s whittling away definition remains relevant today. The Lanham Act provides
that, subject to the principles of equity:
[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired
distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at
any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark
or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution
by tarnishment . . . regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury. 22

This is a codified response to Schechter’s whittling away problem. No confusion is
required, likewise no “actual economic injury.” Just as Kodak could not have proved that
it lost out on bathtub profits—or probably even that it lost goodwill when people slipped
and fell while bathing in a “Kodak” tub—so modern producers need not prove
measurable injury to their bottom lines. Holders are entitled to protect the “unique
distinctiveness” of their marks without a greater showing of injury or, as in an
infringement action, consumer confusion.
1. Blurring
¶16

Although the examples discussed so far pertain to the idea of dilution by
tarnishment, blurring is also a version of dilution under the Lanham Act. The language
of the Act explains that blurring “impairs the distinctiveness” of the mark (whereas
tarnishment “harms the reputation” of the mark). 23 Blurring thus remains close to
Schechter’s idea of whittling away identity.
¶17
The underlying reasoning for disallowing blurring is that: (i) the mark is valuable
because it has a particular association in the public mind (i.e. “distinctiveness” in the

19

Id. at 825, 831.
Id. at 825 (emphasis added).
21
Id. at 830.
22
§ 43(c)(1).
23
§ 43(c)(2)(B)–(C).
20
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language of the Lanham Act or “unique distinctiveness” in Schechter’s terms), and (ii)
that anything reducing the popular association in turn damages the mark.
2. Tarnishment
¶18

Although now actionable under the Lanham Act, tarnishment was not always
available as a federal cause of action and is a relatively recent development in trademark
law. In the landmark case, Moseley v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, Inc., the Supreme
Court suggested, in dicta, that dilution by tarnishment would not be enforceable under the
then-Federal Trademark Dilution Act (“FTDA,” 1999), unless actual economic harm
could be shown. 24 The case concerned a store selling adult products, which was initially
called “Victor’s Secret,” and then, after threat of legal action, “Victor’s Little Secret.”
(The change proved insufficient to forestall legal action by Victoria’s Secret.) Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, cited Schechter’s article extensively and tried to be
faithful to Schechter’s understanding of dilution. 25
¶19
However, the Supreme Court handed down Moseley in 2003. In 2006, the TDRA
marked a significant and deliberate shift away from Moseley. 26 Incorporated into the
Lanham Act, the TDRA expressly provides that both blurring and tarnishment are
actionable at federal law. 27 The TDRA also removed the requirement of actual economic
injury under either theory.
¶20
Unlike blurring, tarnishment clearly goes beyond Schechter’s definition. Rather
than relying on a preexisting association between the mark and popular consciousness,
which could be subject to blurring, tarnishment expands the ambit of dilution to include
the creation of alternative, new associations. Specifically, it addresses new associations
that are negative and could harm the reputation of the mark if left unchecked. Milky Way,
discussed above, serves as a paradigm example of tarnishment—a family-friendly
product acquired new, unwanted associations with sex. 28
C. Standards Applied in Dilution Actions
¶21

Courts assessing tarnishment and blurring are directed by the Lanham Act to apply
different standards. However, both actions require that the mark at issue is “famous.” 29
A mark is famous for the purposes of the Lanham Act if “it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public as a designation of source of the goods or services of the
mark’s owner.” 30 The Act provides four factors to assess famousness: (i) the duration,
extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised
24

Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 432 (2003).
Id. at 429.
26
§ 43(c).
27
§ 43(c)(1).
28
An alternative way of expressing this would be that Milky Way’s preexisting reputation for
“wholesome fun” (or whatever the opposite of sex is) was damaged by association with sexualized images.
This would make the rationale for tarnishment the same as for blurring—i.e., the damaging of a preexisting
association. However, it is clear that at least some courts have been willing to find for the plaintiff in
tarnishment cases on the basis of a wholly new association, without consideration of existing associations.
The action leaves open this option.
29
§ 43(c)(1).
30
§ 43(c)(2)(A).
25
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or publicized by the owner or third parties; (ii) the amount, volume, and geographic
extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (iii) the extent of actual
recognition of the mark; and (iv) whether the mark was registered. 31 Both actions also
require, in another development under the TDRA, a finding of only likely rather than
actual dilution (the latter had been the standard under the FTDA). 32 Thus, dilution
demands neither a showing of actual economic injury nor actual dilution.
¶22
The Lanham Act provides six factors that courts may consider in blurring suits,
subject to relevance: (i) the degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the
famous mark; (ii) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark;
(iii) the extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially
exclusive use of the mark; (iv) the degree of recognition of the famous mark; (v) whether
the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the famous
mark; and (vi) any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous
mark. 33
¶23
The full definition of dilution by tarnishment is “association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of
the famous mark.” 34 Lynda Oswald has noted that this definition is typically met in one
of three possible scenarios, which also serve to illustrate some of the wide range of
factors applied by courts in tarnishment cases. The first scenario arises when “a
plaintiff’s trademark is linked to products of a shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an
unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about the owner’s
product.” 35 The second arises when the reproduction and the original are almost
identical. The third arises when “alterations of a mark are made by a competitor with
both an incentive to diminish the favorable attributes of the mark and ample opportunity
to promote its products in ways that make no significant alteration.” 36
¶24
Additionally, some commentators have posited the possibility that “free riding”
should be regarded as a de facto third version of the dilution action, in addition to
blurring and tarnishment. 37 Without considering whether free riding is a freestanding
theory of dilution (or whether it should be), as I discuss below, it is a significant public
policy concern underlying dilution.
IV. THE PARODY DEFENSE, WHOLESOMENESS, TORTIOUSNESS, AND INTENT
¶25

To understand what parody means in the context of trademark law, it is informative
to begin with a general definition of the term “parody.” A widely cited and serviceable
definition is that, in order to be successful, a parody must: (i) “convey two
simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not

31

§ 43(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv).
§ 43(c)(2)(B).
33
§ 43(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi).
34
§ 43(c)(2)(C).
35
Lynda J. Oswald, “Tarnishment” and “Blurring” Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,
36 AM. BUS. L.J. 255, 277 (1999).
36
Id.
37
See Cacovean, supra note 4, at 453–54.
32
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the original and is instead a parody;” and (ii) “communicate some articulable element of
satire, ridicule, joking, or amusement.” 38
One commentator has noted that, for the first requirement of this definition, “the
line between mimicry and deviation” is tough to traverse. 39 If a parody doesn’t go far
enough in distinguishing itself from the original product, then it risks being a source of
confusion rather than parody, and would thus be vulnerable under an infringement action.
On the other hand, if the parody goes too far then it risks becoming just a joke, without
parodic content.
Within the context of dilution, the parody defense is codified in the Lanham Act
under the fair use exception, which states that “identifying and parodying, criticizing, or
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark
owner” is excluded from coverage by dilution. 40 Initially this reads like an allencompassing protection for parodies. However, the defense is not available for parodies
that are primarily commercial, which is defined as “a designation of source for the
person’s own goods.” 41
In practice, a further consideration as to whether a parody defense will be upheld is
the distinction between a “wholesome” and “unwholesome” parody. One illustration of
this distinction is Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd. 42 Addressing an action
under New Mexico’s trademark act, the case overtly employs the notion of
wholesomeness. The court found that Jordache Jeans, using a horse’s head logo, were
not diluted by defendant’s “Lardashe” jeans for large size women (the defendant’s jeans
featured a pig logo). Addressing the plaintiff’s tarnishment argument, the court reasoned
that an “undesirable, unwholesome, or unsavory mental association” had not been
sufficiently created by the parody because it was not “particularly unwholesome,”
although potentially “in poor taste” to some consumers. 43
Similarly, in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E.
Windows Corp., the court addressed a motion for a preliminary injunction based on the
theory that the defendant’s slogan “The Best Bar on Earth” tarnished, by association with
alcohol, “The Best Show on Earth”—Ringling’s circus slogan. 44 The court denied the
injunction on the grounds of the plaintiff’s failure to prove likelihood of success on the
merits. 45 The court noted that the circus already played in some venues serving alcohol,
and thus that an association with alcohol was neither new nor tarnishing. 46
By contrast, in Milky Way the court found injunctive relief appropriate where the
defendant depicted plaintiff’s “Poppin’ Fresh” and “Poppie Fresh” characters in
Similarly, in American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved
sexualized images. 47
38
See, e.g., People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir.
2001); Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007).
39
See Laura E. Little, Regulating Funny: Humor and the Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1235, 1265 (2009).
40
§ 43(c)(3)(A)–(A)(ii).
41
§ 43(c)(3)(A).
42
Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48 (D. N.M. 1985).
43
Id. at 57.
44
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
45
Id. at 211.
46
Id.
47
See supra Part II.
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Laboratories, the court found for the plaintiff under New York anti-dilution law, in a
motion for preliminary injunction against the defendant’s condom carrying-case. The
carrying-case was emblazoned with a bust of a gladiator and the words “America
Express” and “Don’t Leave Home Without It.” 48
¶31
All of these tarnishment cases support the observation that courts are influenced by
the perceived wholesomeness of the parody at issue, although—as discussed further
below, and already illustrated by Ringling Bros.—the plaintiff’s prior reputation for
wholesomeness is sometimes relevant too. The relevance of the distinction between
wholesome and unwholesome parodies is particularly evident for actions in which
tarnishment is alleged. As we have seen, tarnishment exists to prevent lessening the
“commercial magnetism” or “magic” of the mark by the creation of new associations. 49
As common sense suggests, an action brought under this theory will be more credible
where the new and supposedly negative association is not with puppies and sunshine, but
rather with something “distasteful or off-putting” (unless perhaps the distinctive quality
of the original product is that it is distasteful or off-putting). 50
¶32
Courts applying tarnishment theories are thus more likely to attach liability where
the parody alludes to something risqué, offensive, or crude. However, the outcome may
also be influenced by the mode of humor employed. Laura Little observes that, although
not expressly recognizing this reasoning, courts are sometimes more likely to permit an
ostensibly unwholesome parody where it involves “release humor” 51 because release
humor serves a social function. Release humor involves making light of something in
such a way as to induce catharsis. “Incongruity humor,” by contrast, is more akin to
being just a joke—and is less likely to find sympathy in court. As implied by the name,
incongruity humor simply means placing something where it would not normally be
found (for example, in the non-parody realm, a frog drinking Budweiser).
¶33
The wholesomeness of the parody seems as if it ought not to be relevant in the
context of infringement actions. The inquiry in this context, after all, is whether
consumers are likely to be confused. There is no obvious reason why confusion would
turn on whether or not the parody is obscene. Nevertheless, some infringement cases also
evidence the willingness of courts to favor plaintiffs whose marks are linked by the
defendant to prurient material. In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat
Cinema, Ltd., for example (cited in Jordache Enterprises as an example of a case
illustrating a “particularly unwholesome” parody), the court held that a pornographic film
featuring actresses in Dallas Cowboys cheerleader outfits was “sexually depraved,” and
factored this consideration into its finding that the Cowboys’s marks had been
infringed. 52 Similarly, Coke was successful in obtaining a preliminary injunction against
a supposed parody, “Enjoy Cocaine.” 53 The court in this case held that this attempted
parody failed, because it did not go far enough in distinguishing itself from the original to
48
Am. Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs. Co., No. 87 Civ. 8840 (CSH), 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4377
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 1989).
49
ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS,
PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS, § 30.6, at 719 (2003).
50
Id.
51
See Little, supra note 39, at 1267–68.
52
Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 625 F. Supp. 48, 57 (D. N.M. 1985); Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979).
53
Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1187 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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avoid a high likelihood of confusion. 54 For no apparent reason, given the nature of the
action, the court also noted in support of its holding:
Judicial notice may be taken that cocaine is a narcotic drug possession of which
for nonmedical purposes is a felonious criminal offense against the laws of the
United States punishable by substantial prison terms and fines. . . . The
stringency of those laws reflects the national concern that cocaine—far from
being “enjoyable”—is part of the tragic drug problem currently afflicting this
nation, and particularly its youth. To associate such a noxious substance as
cocaine with plaintiff's wholesome beverage as symbolized by its “Coca-Cola”
trademark and format would clearly have a tendency to impugn that product and
injure plaintiff's business reputation. 55

On the other hand, there are more recent infringement cases that evidence a reversal of
the trend in Pussycat Cinema and Coca-Cola. In Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Co. the court made the obvious point that “the more distasteful and bizarre the parody,
the less likely the public is to mistakenly think that the trademark owner has sponsored or
approved it.” 56 The court thus drew on the basic notion of confusion in infringement
suits, avoiding the somewhat moralistic detour of the Pussycat Cinema and Coca-Cola
decisions.
¶34
Some have argued that an emphasis on perceived wholesomeness causes
tarnishment to operate like an intentional tort. 57 Just as defamation of a person requires
injury to reputation, so tarnishment requires injury to the reputation of a mark. One way
of viewing these cases is that the defendant cannot tarnish a reputation that is already
tarnished in the same manner. A further way of looking at these cases, not previously
considered, would be to say that the wholesomeness of the parody operates in a way
analogous to the defense of “truth” in defamation. It is true to say that “The Best Bar on
Earth” is no less wholesome than an alcohol-serving circus—a true statement is thus
implied in the parody of the circus. Therefore, no new injurious association could be
created. By contrast, it is not true to say that American Express is already tarnished with
sexual innuendo; therefore, the parody fails for want of an element of truth, and an
injurious association could be created. This accords with common sense. A sketch
depicting, for example, Mother Teresa as uncharitable and mean would not be a
“parody”—there is no grain of truth to the depiction. It would merely be a slur or, in the
legal vernacular, a tarnishment. Parody requires a kernel of truth, or at least believability,
to avoid dilution.
¶35
A final consideration regarding whether courts are likely to find that a parody
defense is successful is the issue of intent. Joseph Dreitler argues that courts consider
intent when deciding whether a parody is valid, both for infringement and dilution
actions. 58 Specifically, Dreitler argues that courts ask whether the defendant intended to
parody or to profit. However, Dreitler’s account is inaccurate. All infringement claims
54

Id. at 1190.
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require use in commerce, and all infringement claims require some kind of reproduction
of a protected mark. Assuming that these things do not happen by accident, intent to
profit would always be satisfied. The issue, as framed in the Lanham Act, is not whether
the defendant intended to profit, but whether the defendant intended primarily to profit.
Citing Wendy’s International, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc., Dreitler claims the court found that
the defendant’s use of Wendy’s trademarks in “Little Wendy” in its own advertising
campaigns could not constitute a valid parody because the use of the marks was plainly
an intentional ploy to free ride off the mark. 59 However, Dreitler overstates the
conclusiveness of the holding. The court held that “where it is shown that the alleged
infringer used the movant's mark knowingly and with the intention of deriving some
benefit from it, a strong inference of probable confusion arises . . . .” 60 A strong
inference is not a categorical intent rule. Nevertheless, the strong inference may still
form part of a range of tools used by a court in assessing a parody-defense case. It is
simply that framing the issue solely as one of “intent to profit” is misleading. As the next
section discusses, the “commercial” dimension of speech is relevant to the parody
defense, but it is not always dispositive—nor should it be.
V. PARODY AND PUBLIC POLICY
¶36

In this section, I argue that parody ought to be a stronger bar to relief. Particularly,
I argue that that parody should be a strong bar to recovery in dilution actions, even those
where the alleged parody is commercially motivated.
A. Parody, the First Amendment, and Commercial Use
A defendant generally asserts a parody defense to establish that consumers would
not likely confuse the protected product with the challenged product or
communication. This argument may have force beyond simply negating an
element of the plaintiff's claim, however, because of the solicitude accorded to
parody under First Amendment case law. 61

There is a sliding scale of protection for parodies, predicated not merely on an assessment
of wholesomeness, tortiousness, or intent, but also on the perceived political or apolitical
content of the parody. 62 The scale derives from First Amendment jurisprudence. Courts
afford political and cultural parodies a higher level of protection than commercial
parodies. For example, in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. a district court in Georgia held
that Smith’s products (T-shirts and other novelty products) accusing Wal-Mart of, inter
alia, “Walocaust,” and of being “Wal-Qaeda,” were analogous to sandwich-boards
historically worn by protestors, and were noncommercial, political speech subject to First
Amendment protection (even though Mr. Smith sold his creations). 63 The court
addressed the protection the First Amendment affords to parody and concluded that
59

Id. at 342 (citing Wendy’s Int’l, Inc. v. Big Bite, Inc. 576 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1983)).
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“tarnishment caused merely by an editorial or artistic parody which satirizes [the
complainant’s] product or its image is not actionable under an anti-dilution statute
because of the free speech protections of the First Amendment.” 64
¶37
Similarly, in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that cultural
content is afforded protection in parodies, although the defendant had been selling its
parody. Specifically, the court concluded that the “Barbie” doll is a cultural as well as a
commercial symbol, and that Barbie could be a necessary component of artistic
expression not merely a commercial symbol. 65 The case addressed a song called “Barbie
Girl,” by the band Aqua, which the manufacturer of Barbie (Mattel) claimed diluted its
Barbie marks because of lyrics such as: “Life in plastic, it's fantastic. You can brush my
hair, undress me everywhere.” 66 Mattel filed suit against the band’s record company,
MCA Records. Addressing the dilution claim, the court held for the defendant, noting:
[T]he song also lampoons the Barbie image and comments humorously on the
cultural values Aqua claims she represents. Use of the Barbie mark in the song
Barbie Girl therefore falls within the noncommercial use exemption to the
FTDA. For precisely the same reasons, use of the mark in the song's title is also
exempted. 67

By contrast, a district court in Massachusetts held in General Electric Co. v. Alumpa
Coal Co. that “Genital Electric” products, although seemingly similar to the equally
doubtful “Walocaust” pun, were without protection because there was a “great
probability of confusion among the general public.” 68 In this case, unlike Mattel and
Wal-Mart, the court did not consider a First Amendment issue relevant, because the
message was intended for a primarily commercial purpose—i.e., to sell the joke, rather
than to make the joke.
¶38
The First Amendment should, however, always be relevant in parody-defense
cases, and courts should not be quick to deny protection to parodies on the grounds that a
parody is “primarily commercial”—if that requirement should remain in the Lanham Act
at all. The history of the First Amendment evidences a longstanding concern to protect
parody, even where there is a commercial component to propagating the parody. As the
court in Wal-Mart in fact recognized, the correct question is not whether speech is
commercial or not, but whether it is commercial to such an extent as to overwhelm the
underlying parody. 69 As I discuss below, it is virtually unimaginable, particularly in
dilution actions, that commercial purpose ever overwhelms the parody, provided the
parody is genuine. Courts should begin by looking at whether the defendant has a
genuine parody, not whether the parody is primarily commercial.
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B. Commercial Use and Free Riding
¶39

¶40

¶41

¶42

¶43

¶44

Contrary to the prevailing trend in First Amendment jurisprudence, some
commentators argue that the reluctance of courts to find First Amendment protection for
parodies that are primarily commercial does not go far enough in preventing the use of
the parody defense, and that parodies effectively provide a shield for free-riding.
Corina Cacovean argues that, as a matter of policy, the law should diligently
prevent free riding under the guise of parody. 70 Cacovean notes that one possible
approach to the commercial parody question is a subjective test looking at whether the
defendant intended to exploit the existing mark commercially. However, Cacovean
concludes that, without an objective test, courts lack guidance. 71
According to Cacovean, an objective test would have changed the outcome in an
often cited case, Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog. In this case, the Fourth
Circuit ruled for the defendant, holding that “Chewy Vuiton” dog toys were valid
parodies, despite the strong commercial impetus behind the parody. 72
Cacovean suggests a commercial gains test as an objective alternative to what she
sees as the more subjective approach of the Fourth Circuit and other courts. Cocovean’s
test would reject the parody defense under either type of trademark action, either where
the parody led directly to the sale of goods or where any commercial gain ensued to the
defendant. Cacovean argues such a test would be in keeping with the general public
interest in preventing free riding. Cacovean notes two possible models for such a test.
First, Cacovean notes, “in South America, famous marks benefit from higher
protection than that allowed to Louis Vuitton in United States.” 73 She goes on to note
that the Brazilian Patents and Trademarks Office recognizes a set of “highly renowned”
trademarks which are, because of their “economic attractiveness,” afforded a higher level
of protection. 74 This group includes marks such as McDonald’s, Visa, and Hollywood.
Cacovean goes on to note, “[i]n a large majority of cases the Special Commission
[afforded] . . . special protection in all classes of goods and service.” 75
Second, under European law, “protection for famous marks in the European Union
is more flexible.” 76 Cacovean cites two cases from the European Court of Justice
(“ECJ”), Davidoff & Cie S.A. v. Gofkid Ltd. and Adidas-Salomon AG v. Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., where the court held that “the anti-dilution law is an overarching legal
remedy applicable to any and all situations, whether the goods and services are
competitive, similar, or non-similar.” 77
Cacovean concludes that “[t]he ECJ
interpretation reflects a tendency for a [sic] more flexible protection.” 78
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¶45

However, as we have seen, Cacovean’s strict “any commercial gains” test would
not comport with the First Amendment. Cases such as Wal-Mart and Mattel show that
the First Amendment affords at least some protection to parodies, even where the
parodies lead to commercial gain.
¶46
On other hand, parodies are not protected where they are primarily commercial.
This leaves parodies in a gray area when they are associated with products for sale, but
are arguably not primarily a commercial endeavor. Balancing a Cacovean-like position
with the other pole—i.e. absolute permissiveness—we need to ask, not just what is best
for trademark holders, but also what is best for consumers?
C. Parody and Consumer Freedom

¶47

A rigid prohibition on profiting from parodies of trademarks would not be a policy
favorable to the majority of consumers. The general disadvantage for consumers can be
illustrated by a “literary” reference.
¶48
In the comedy movie, Coming to America, Eddie Murphy plays an African Prince
named Akeem, who “comes to America” seeking a wife who will accept him for his
personality, rather than his nobility. He takes a position at “McDowell’s,” a restaurant
with all of the hallmarks of a McDonald’s, including big golden arches, and a specialty
burger, the “Big Mick.” 79
¶49
In the real world, the name of Prince Akeem’s employer would probably amount to
infringement of McDonald’s trademarks. Indeed, the restaurant in the movie is “under
investigation” by McDonald’s. Nevertheless, despite the many aspects of Coming to
America that require suspension of disbelief, the fact that McDowell’s consumers do not
appear to be “confused” by the McDonald’s-esque diner is not one of them. It is wholly
credible that consumers would recognize the distinction between McDonald’s and this
comically bad imitation.
¶50
This speaks to a broader point about the acute perceptions and distinguishing
capabilities of actual consumers, who are often divorced from: (i) the rarified discussion
of doctrine, and (ii) the focus on the parties to lawsuits (typically two commercial
producers). One commentator argues that a problem with infringement actions is that,
the confusion requirement notwithstanding, they actually fail to protect the vast majority
of consumers who have the common sense not to be confused. 80 Michael Grynberg
notes, in one case:
The specificity of the harm of confusion to a survey-defined group of buyers
easily trumped the harms to the nonconfused who were never considered as a
distinct class. The defendants stood alone; the court considered only their
interest in the plaintiff's marks, not the interests of the public for whom the
defendants were a proxy. 81

The public policy of protecting consumers from confusion is not well served by finding
producers liable for parodies in situations where the parodies at issue simply would not
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confuse the silent majority of consumers (even if the parody confused some consumers in
a sample group used as trial evidence). Similarly, Little makes the point that “consumers
understand that it would be incongruous for the profit-maximizing producer of a
protected product to undercut the product.” 82
Grynberg’s position is persuasive. However, it is open to attack on the grounds that it
relies on prioritizing one public benefit (free consumption) over another (not confusing
less sophisticated consumers) without much justification. 83 Furthermore, while Grynberg
might be right that existing law errs in privileging the prevention of confusion over free
consumption, his seems like an argument for making confusion harder to prove.
Grynberg thus misses the bigger point. The strongest case to be made for protecting
consumers against the over-sensitive and litigious natures of producers is not in
infringement actions, but in dilution actions. Dilution actions are in no way underpinned
by an interest in directly protecting consumers. Dilution does not overlook unconfused
consumers, instead it avoids consideration of consumer interests altogether. Dilution
exists to prevent rival producers from making famous brands look bad or less distinctive,
while at the same time profiting from the denigration of the famous brand. As such,
dilution actions fit perfectly into the problematic mold of Producer X v. Producer Y
litigation, because consumer benefits are at best an unintended consequence of the
litigation.
¶51
There are at least two reasons why protecting famous trademarks from dilution,
even dilution via a parody that is itself commercialized, is a dubious position. The first
reason for thinking that famous trademarks do not require protection from dilution recalls
the rationale in Twentieth Century Fox—namely, that “unwholesome” parodies can in
fact be the least problematic of parodies. The court in that case stated, “the more
distasteful and bizarre the parody, the less likely the public is to mistakenly think that the
trademark owner has sponsored or approved it.” 84 Turning that logic on its head, we can
say that the less distasteful and bizarre the trademark, the more likely it is that a parody
will seem innocuous. In other words, famous brands (by definition not distasteful to
many consumers) do not need protection to sustain their “magic.” Famous trademarks
are those least in danger of being diluted, because they already command mass public
recognition and approval. This follows, provided that consumers are not actually
confused into thinking that what they are looking at—i.e. a parody—is genuinely a
product of the original producer. This eventuality, however, would be actionable under
infringement.
¶52
Again, a common sense check is sufficient to demonstrate the reasonableness of
this position. For example, consider Vibra Approved Laboratories. Why would someone
actually be less likely to open an American Express account because they had witnessed
a condom case with a similar logo, when they knew the case had nothing to do with the
real American Express?
¶53
The second reason for thinking that famous brands do not require protection from
negative associations is purely functional. Conventional free-market economics theory
82
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dictates that famous marks are famous because of the quality of the underlying product.
To be sure, marketing also plays a role in selling goods. However, it is to be expected
that consumers will eventually shun shoddy products no matter how well they are
marketed, in favor of a superior product. It follows that if famous brands represent
genuinely superior products they will continue to succeed because of their quality,
irrespective of dilution of their marks. If American Express genuinely has the best deals
on credit cards, then being associated with condom carrying cases should not matter. On
the other hand, if the benefits of being an American Express member were merely
smoke-and-mirrors, easily shattered by a cheap joke, then the product deserves to fail.
¶54
As I have presented it, the second point is a little simplistic. It is true that a good
parody could affect the sales even of a superior product, for example by making
ownership of it simply embarrassing. However, the reality is that dilution already fails to
protect against this risk. There is no obvious reason for thinking that purely
commercialized parodies are more likely to be successful at creating embarrassment than,
say, a sketch on “Saturday Night Live” or a viral video online, both of which would
likely be protected as artistic content.
¶55
In practice, it is apparent that what dilution serves to protect is an elite group of
famous brands—the very group whose trademarks are least in need of protection. It
should not be surprising that, as one one commentator notes, “Federal dilution has
become a luxury claim.” 85 As Schechter effectively showed, dilution laws are a product
of the bygone and paternalistic protection of elite, luxury European brands. Under the
Lanham Act, ironically, trademarks are not really protected against dilution, which is still
possible under non-commercial guises. Instead, famous marks are protected against valid
but commercial enterprises, which are doing little more than profiting from the public
preference for mocking power. This runs contrary to free competition, and contrary to
the interests of a public capable of being discerning—capable of getting the joke.
D. Parody First, Commercialization Second
¶56

The foregoing analysis notwithstanding, I do not mean to suggest that the dilution
action should be completely removed, as it has some clear virtues. Indeed, even in the
context of parody, there are obvious reasons why a multinational fast food company, for
example Burger King, should be prevented from producing a product called,
“McDonald’s Death Nuggets.” Very little public function is served by insults made by
obviously self-interested parties—even if those insults might look like parodies to some
observers.
¶57
However, the definition of a successful parody is already sufficiently narrow to
avoid this risk. Courts should not be concerned, primarily, with whether the creator of a
parody also profits and to what extent. The definition of a genuine parody should be the
first consideration of any court addressing the parody defense. This approach—parody
first, commercialization second—retains the benefits of the dilution action, while better
protecting consumer interests.
85
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¶58

Recall that a parody must (i) “convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody;”
and (ii) “communicate some articulable element of satire, ridicule, joking, or
amusement.” 86 This means that mere insults and negative marketing, even if they meet
the element of being satirical or amusing, fall short of the required standard. Such a
product as McDonald’s Death Nuggets obviously would not convey “convey two
simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not
the original and is instead a parody.” As we have seen, “the line between mimicry and
deviation” 87 is tough to traverse, and the mimicry in this hypothetical would be palpably
weak. No-one could ever, even for a fleeting moment, think that McDonald’s actually
produced this product (conceivably around Halloween, or the release of a movie called
“Death,” etc.—but not otherwise).
¶59
Courts, therefore, could begin with inquiry into whether a parody is genuine
because that approach is workable—it proposes two understandable elements already
used. In addition, this approach is desirable, because it returns the focus of inquiry to the
consumer. By looking, first, at whether a parody is genuine, rather than at whether it is
primarily commercial, a court would protect any successful parody as a matter of law.
Whether a producer could be losing out on perceived “brand magnetism,” by the
whittling away of its good name, would be very much a secondary inquiry. This
approach would accord with protecting freedom of consumption, and would avoid
removing the interests of unconfused consumers from the judicial calculus. To be sure, it
might lead to unpredictable results. Asking a court to determine what is funny and
genuinely parodic is unlikely to be more predictable than asking it to determine what is
commercial. However, the court would be forced to consider the parody itself—the item
in the equation given First Amendment solicitude—and to do so from a consumer’s point
of view. This, at least, begins the analysis in the right place.
¶60
Again, any confusion created by a parody product would still be actionable under a
theory of infringement. The point of focusing on genuine parodies is not to allow chaos
and confusion to rein on restaurant menus or supermarket shelves. However, in order to
retain the advantages of a dilution action, while also protecting freedom of consumption,
courts should ask not whether a supposed parody is primarily commercial, but whether it
is a parody at all. A real-life “McDowell’s,” tucked away in a corner of the Bronx?
Maybe. Burger King’s hypotehtical “McDonald’s Death Nuggets?” Clearly actionable.
The answer, in other words, is merely to enforce the definition of “parody,” not to
scrutinize the degree of commercialization behind the speech.
¶61
The only time that commercialization would need to be assessed, under a
definition-first approach, would be when the question of whether a parody was
successful proved inconclusive. This follows because assessing the degree of
commercialization is, in fact, an indirect way of assessing the genuineness of a parody.
A genuine parody is by definition not “primarily commercial,” because a primarily
commercial message ceases to be a parody, and becomes instead a marketing device or
an advertisement. There are not two contradictory messages in an advertisement, there is
only one: “buy me.”
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A parody may not be primarily commercial. However, commercial speech may be
a parody. By beginning the analysis with the question of whether the speech is
commercial, courts begin the inquiry in the wrong place. In doing so, they cut consumer
interests in consuming genuine parodies out of the equation, or at least relegate those
interests to a secondary concern. Courts should begin by asking whether the defendant
produced a genuine parody. If it did, that should end the inquiry. If the answer is
inconclusive then, and only then, should the court should consider whether the parody is
primarily commercial.
VI. CONCLUSION

¶63

“The protection of trademarks originated as a police measure to prevent ‘the
grievous deceit of the people’ by the sale of defective goods, and to safeguard the
collective good will and monopoly of the gild.” 88
¶64
Today, preventing the “grievous deceit of the people” remains a valid public-policy
concern. However, I have argued that prohibiting parodies that cause no confusion, and
that successfully meet the specific requirements of a genuine parody, serves no public
benefit. Instead, it risks creating a modern-day guild, comprising the handful of famous
marks that fall under the ambit of the federal dilution action, with unprecedented power
to enjoin and seek damages for parody.
¶65
Parody should be interpreted as a strong bar against relief in dilution actions,
defeated only in cases in which a supposed parody is not really a parody at all. This
approach gives proper weight to the interests of consumers and to the protection of
parodies.
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